Codebook for Regional Authority Index (RAI)
Country Scores Dataset

version July 2015

Citation for the dataset:

Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, Sandra Chapman Osterkatz, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sarah Shair-Rosenfield (2016). *A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance. Volume I: Measuring Regional Authority.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Data for the Regional Authority Index (RAI) are in two datasets: one with annual scores for 231 regional governments/tiers in 65 countries for the period 1950-2010, and one aggregating these scores to the country level plus with country-level scores for an additional 16 countries that do not have regional governments. Regional authority is measured along ten dimensions. The following documents accompany the datasets:

- Codebook of regional scores dataset
- Codebook of country scores dataset (this document)
- Calculation of country scores

Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis is a country in a given year of evaluation. Country scores aggregate scores for each regional tier and individual regional governments in a country. These regional scores are available in the regional scores dataset.

The aggregation is in three steps. First, we calculate a score for each standard tier and each non-standard region (see regional dataset). Second, we weight scores by population.[1] Where a tier is composed of regions with different scores, a score for that tier is calculated by weighting each region's score by its share in the national population. Where lower-level regions exist only in a subset of higher-level regions or where scores for lower-level regions vary across higher-level regions, the lower-level scores are weighted by the population of the higher-level regions of which they are part. Third, we sum scores of each tier.

We evaluate five dimensions of self-rule: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, and representation. We evaluate five dimensions of shared rule: law making, executive control, fiscal control, borrowing control, and constitutional reform. There are two forms of shared rule. We code multilateral shared rule when a region's authority is contingent on coordination with other regions. We code bilateral shared rule when a region's authority is not contingent on coordination with other regions. We use the higher number of multilateral and bilateral shared rule for each dimension at each tier to calculate the country score.

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[1] We use population figures for 2010 or the nearest year except in the rare case that a country gains or loses territory or partitions. Separate datasets ("calculation of country scores") contain population figures.

The table below breaks these ten dimensions down into institutional categories that we code at the regional level. The categories for shared rule refer to multilateral shared rule (see the regional codebook for the descriptions of bilateral shared rule.) The range refers to the theoretical range at the level of the individual region or regional tier—not the empirical range at the aggregate country level, which can be higher than the theoretical range in countries with more than one tier.

For a detailed discussion of how we develop the measure, please read:

Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, Sandi Chapman Osterkatz, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sarah Shair-Rosenfield (2016). Chapter One: Measuring Regional Authority. *A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance. Volume I: Measuring Regional Authority.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

For a discussion of how we apply the measure and adjudicate gray cases, please read:

Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, Sandi Chapman Osterkatz, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sarah Shair-Rosenfield (2015). Chapter Three: How We Apply the Coding Scheme. *A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance. Volume I: Measuring Regional Authority.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

VARIABLE NAME	RANGE (region)	VALUES AND LABELS
cowcode	2-920	Correlates of War codes (http://www.correlatesofwar.org)
iso3166	8-999	International Organization for Standardization (ISO 3166-1). Kosovo = 999
country_ID	1-126	Country ID (see table below)
country_name		Country name in English (see table below)
abbr_country		Abbreviation of country name
year	1950-2010	Year of evaluation
n_instdepth	1-4	The extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated: 0: no functioning general-purpose administration at regional level 1: deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration 2: non-deconcentrated, general–purpose, administration subject to central government veto 3: non-deconcentrated, general–purpose, administration *not* subject to central government veto.

n_policy	0-4	The range of policies for which a regional government is responsible: 0: very weak authoritative competence in a), b), c), d) whereby a) economic policy; b) cultural-educational policy; c) welfare policy; d) one of the following: residual powers, police, own institutional set–up, local government 1: authoritative competencies in one of a), b), c) or d) 2: authoritative competencies in at least two of a), b), c), or d) 3: authoritative competencies in d) and at least two of a), b), or c) 4: criteria for 3 plus authority over immigration or citizenship.
n_fiscauto	0-4	The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population: 0: central government sets base and rate of all regional taxes. 1: regional government sets the rate of minor taxes 2: regional government sets base and rate of minor taxes 3: regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax 4: regional government sets base and rate of at least one major tax.

n_borrowauto	0-3	The extent to which a regional government can borrow:
		0: the regional government does not borrow (e.g. centrally imposed rules prohibit borrowing)
		1: the regional government may borrow under prior authorization (*ex ante*) by the central government and with one or more of the following centrally imposed restrictions:
		  a. golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits)
		  b. no foreign borrowing or borrowing from the central bank
		  c. no borrowing above a ceiling
		  d. borrowing is limited to specific purposes
		2: the regional government may borrow without prior authorization (*ex post*) and under one or more of a), b), c), d)
		3: the regional government may borrow without centrally imposed restrictions.

n_rep	0-4	The extent to which a region has an independent legislature and executive, which is the sum of *assembly* and *executive*.

n_lawmaking	0-2	The extent to which regional representatives co–determine national legislation, which is the sum of *law_a* to *law_f* (see below for breakdown).
n_execcon	0-2	The extent to which a regional government co–determines national policy in intergovernmental meetings: 0: no routine meetings between central and regional governments 1: routine meetings between central and regional governments without legally binding authority 2: routine meetings between central and regional governments with legally binding authority
n_fisccon	0-2	The extent to which regional representatives co–determine the distribution of national tax revenues: 0: neither the regional governments nor their representatives in a national legislature are consulted over the distribution of national tax revenues 1: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature negotiate over the distribution of tax revenues, but do not have a veto 2: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues
n_borrowcon	0-2	The extent to which a regional government co–determines subnational and national borrowing constraints: 0: regional governments are not routinely consulted over borrowing constraints 1: regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints but do not have a veto 2: regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints
n_constit	0-4	The extent to which regional representatives co–determine constitutional change: 0: the central government or national electorate can unilaterally reform the constitution 1: a national legislature based on regional representation can propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum 2: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum 3: a legislature based on regional representation can veto constitutional change; or constitutional change requires a referendum based on the principle of equal regional representation 4: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature can veto constitutional change

n_selfrule	0-18	The authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region, which is the sum of *n_instdepth*, *n_policy*, *n_fiscauto*, *n_borrowauto*, and *n_rep*.
n_sharedrule	0-12	The authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole, which is the sum of *n_lawmaking*, *n_execcon*, *n_fisccon*, *n_borrowcon*, and *n_constit*.
n_RAI	0-30	Regional authority index, which is the sum of *n_selfrule* and *n_sharedrule*.
COMPONENTS		
n_rep	0-4	See above.
n_assembly	0-2	0: no regional assembly. 1: indirectly elected regional assembly 2: directly elected assembly
n_executive	0-2	0: no regional executive or appointed by central government 1: dual executive appointed by central government and regional assembly 2: regional executive appointed by a regional assembly or is directly elected
n_lawmaking	0-3	See above.
n_law_a	0-0.5	0: a region or regional tier is *not* the unit of representation in a national legislature 0.5: a region or regional tier is the unit of representation in a national legislature
n_law_b	0-0.5	0: a region or regional tier does *not* designate representatives in a national legislature 0.5: a region or regional tier designates representatives in a national legislature
n_law_c	0-0.5	0: regions do *not* have majority representation in a national legislature 0.5: regions have majority representation in a national legislature.
n_law_d	0-0.5	0: the legislature based on regional representation does *not* have extensive legislative authority 0.5: the legislature based on regional representation has extensive legislative authority
n_law_e	0-0.5	0: the regional government or its regional representatives in a national legislature are *not* consulted on national legislation affecting the region 0.5: the regional government or its regional representatives in a national legislature are consulted on national legislation affecting the region
n_law_f	0-0.5	0: the regional government or its regional representatives in a legislature do *not* have veto power over national legislation affecting the region 0.5: the regional government or its regional representatives in a legislature have veto power over national legislation affecting the region

Country ID	Country Name	Country Abbreviation	Years Evaluated
1	Albania	ALB	1992-2010
2	Australia	AUS	1950-2010
3	Austria	AUT	1955-2010
4	Belgium	BEL	1950-2010
5	Bosnia and Herzegovina	BIH	1995-2010
6	Bulgaria	BGR	1991-2010
7	Canada	CAN	1950-2010
8	Croatia	HRV	1991-2010
9	Cyprus	CYP	1960-2010
10	Czech Republic	CZE	1993-2010
11	Denmark	DNK	1950-2010
12	Estonia	EST	1992-2010
13	Finland	FIN	1950-2010
14	France	FRA	1950-2010
15	Germany	GER	1950-2010
16	Greece	GRC	1950-2010
17	Hungary	HUN	1990-2010
18	Iceland	ISL	1950-2010
19	Ireland	IRL	1950-2010
20	Italy	ITA	1950-2010
21	Japan	JAP	1950-2010
22	Latvia	LVA	1990-2010
23	Lithuania	LTU	1992-2010
24	Luxemburg	LUX	1950-2010
25	Macedonia	MKD	1991-2010
26	Malta	MLT	1964-2010
27	Netherlands	NLD	1950-2010
28	New Zealand	NZL	1950-2010
29	Norway	NOR	1950-2010
30	Poland	POL	1990-2010
31	Portugal	PRT	1950-2010
32	Romania	ROM	1991-2010
33	Russian Federation	RUS	1993-2010
34	Serbia and Montenegro	SAM	1992-2006
35	Slovakia	SVK	1993-2010
36	Slovenia	SVN	1990-2010
37	Spain	ESP	1950-2010
38	Sweden	SWE	1950-2010
39	Switzerland	SWI	1950-2010
40	Turkey	TUR	1950-2010
41	United Kingdom	GBR	1950-2010
42	United States	USA	1950-2010
43	Israel	ISR	1950-2010

44	Montenegro	MNE	2007-2010
45	Serbia	SRB	2007-2010
46	Kosovo	KOS	2008-2010
80	Indonesia	INO	1950-2010
81	Malaysia	MLY	1957-2010
82	Philippines	PHL	1950-2010
83	Thailand	THA	1950-2010
84	South Korea	KOR	1950-2010
85	Singapore	SIN	1965-2010
86	Brunei	BRU	1984-2010
87	East Timor	TML	2002-2010
100	Argentina	ARG	1950-2010
101	Bahamas	BHS	1973-2010
102	Barbados	BRB	1966-2010
103	Belize	BLZ	1981-2010
104	Bolivia	BOL	1950-2010
105	Brazil	BRA	1950-2010
106	Chile	CHL	1950-2010
107	Colombia	COL	1950-2010
108	Costa Rica	CRI	1950-2010
109	Cuba	CUB	1950-2010
110	Dominican Republic	DOM	1950-2010
111	Ecuador	ECU	1950-2010
112	El Salvador	SLV	1950-2010
113	Guatemala	GTM	1950-2010
114	Guyana	GUY	1966-2010
115	Haiti	HTI	1950-2010
116	Honduras	HND	1950-2010
117	Jamaica	JAM	1962-2010
118	Mexico	MEX	1950-2010
119	Nicaragua	NIC	1950-2010
120	Panama	PAN	1950-2010
121	Paraguay	PRY	1950-2010
122	Peru	PER	1950-2010
123	Suriname	SUR	1975-2010
124	Trinidad and Tobago	TTO	1962-2010
125	Uruguay	URY	1950-2010
126	Venezuela	VEN	1950-2010